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Opportunities for computer abuse: Considering systems risk 
from the offender’s perspective 
Systems risk refers to the likelihood that an IS is inadequately guarded against certain 
types of damage or loss.  While risks are posed by acts of God, hackers and viruses, 
consideration should also be given to the ‘insider’ threat of dishonest employees, 
intent on undertaking some form of computer abuse.  Against this backdrop, a number 
of researchers have addressed the extent to which security managers are cognizant of 
the very nature of systems risk.  In particular, they note how security practitioners’ 
knowledge of local threats, which form part of such risk, is often fragmented.  This 
contributes to situations where risk reducing efforts are often less than effective.  
Security efforts are further complicated given that the task of managing systems risk 
requires input from a number of departments including, for example, HR, compliance, 
IS/IT and physical security.  In a bid to complement existing research, but also offer a 
fresh perspective, this paper addresses systems risk from the offender’s perspective.  
If systems risk entails the likelihood that an IS is inadequately protected, this text 
considers those conditions, within the organisational context, which offer a criminal 
opportunity for the offender.  To achieve this goal a model known as the ‘Crime 
Specific Opportunity Structure’ is advanced.  Focussing on the opportunities for 
computer abuse, the model addresses the nature of such opportunities with regards to 
the organisational context and the threats posed by rogue employees.  Drawing on a 
number of criminological theories, it is believed the model may help inform managers 
about local threats and, by so doing, enhance safeguard implementation.  
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Introduction 
Systems risk refers to the likelihood that an IS is inadequately guarded against certain 
types of damage or loss (Straub and Welke, 1998).  While some risks are posed by 
acts of God (e.g. fire, flooding, earthquakes), and external threats such as hackers and 
viruses, consideration should also be given to those dishonest employees intent on 
undertaking some form of computer abuse (Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Kesar and 
Rogerson, 1998).  Against this backdrop, a number of researchers have addressed the 
extent to which those managers responsible for security are cognizant of the very 
nature of systems risk (Straub and Welke, 1998; Loch et al, 1992; Goodhue and 
Straub, 1991).  Indeed, Goodhue and Straub (1991) advance a model of managerial 
perceptions of systems risk.  They note how informed perceptions are based on 
knowledge of three areas, including ‘organizational environment’ (knowledge of risks 
inherent to a specific industry), ‘IS environment’ (knowledge of the range of technical 
and managerial controls that can address systems risk) and ‘individual characteristics’ 
(knowledge of local systems risk and the threats which form part of such risk). 
 
However, existing research notes that managerial knowledge of ‘individual 
characteristics’ is often ‘fragmented’ and ‘incomplete’ contributing to situations 
where efforts aimed at reducing risk are often less than effective (Straub and Welke, 
1998; Loch et al, 1992; Straub, 1986a; Straub, 1986b).  This is further complicated by 
the fact the organisational task of managing systems risk requires input from 
numerous departments including, for example, audit, HR, compliance, IS/IT and 
physical security (Schlarman, 2002; Fitzgerald, 2005;  ISO/IEC 17799:2000, 2000).   
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In a bid to further this vein of research, but also offer a fresh perspective, this paper 
addresses systems risk from the offender’s perspective.  Given that systems risk 
entails the likelihood that an IS is insufficiently guarded, this text considers those 
conditions, within the organisational context, which offer a criminal opportunity for 
the offender.  To achieve this goal a model known as the ‘Crime Specific Opportunity 
Structure’ is advanced (Willison, 2002).  Focussing on the opportunities for computer 
abuse, the model addresses the nature of such opportunities with regards to the 
organisational context and the threat posed by rogue employees.  Drawing on a 
number of criminological theories, the crime specific opportunity structure presents 
an in-progress view of IS security, which urges consideration of the relationships 
between the offender, the organisational context, the requisite safeguards (including 
the role of honest employees in enforcing security) and the departments responsible 
for them.  Central to the model is the figure of the offender who, based on the 
perceived costs and benefits, decides whether a certain context offers an opportunity. 
 
The model may complement existing IS security practices by informing managers as 
to the nature of opportunities in the organisational context.  In this sense, knowledge 
of local systems risk, identified by Goodhue and Straub (1991) as ‘individual 
characteristics’, could possibly be enhanced.  By assisting managers in identifying 
those elements which help form an opportunity, and appreciating how the offender 
defines a situation as such, the model may potentially be used to inform the 
application of countermeasures aimed at reducing systems risk. 
 
The next section of the paper reviews the existing literature on opportunity.  This is 
followed by a description of a number of theories that have helped to examine the 
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concept in the field of criminology. An attempt by Clarke (1995) to synthesise these 
theories, in a model entitled the ‘Opportunity Structure for Crime, is then described. A 
number of changes made to the model are cited, culminating in a description of the 
‘Crime Specific Opportunity Structure’ (Willison, 2002).  An application of the model 
to a case of computer fraud forms the subsequent section followed by the discussion, 
conclusion and future research.     
 
 
Criminal Opportunity 
Of those texts that directly address opportunity, the literature divides into two distinct 
areas.  The first group looks at how opportunities figure as a motivational factor with 
regard to individuals.  The second attests to how opportunities are created through 
deficient security.   
 
Opportunity as a Motivational Factor 
A few researchers have discussed opportunities in terms of the motivational impact 
they may have on individuals (Hitchings, 1995; Forester and Morrison, 1994; 
BloomBecker, 1984).  In an early paper, BloomBecker (1984), for example, cites 
eight types of motivational factors.  One of these is ‘the land of opportunity’, where 
rogue employees exploit security loopholes located during the course of their daily 
work activities.  However, other writings that discuss the relationship between 
opportunity and motivation merely mention this phenomenon in passing (Hitchings, 
1995; Forester and Morrison, 1994) as evidenced by Forester and Morrison who 
argue: 
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Experts on computer fraud attest to the fact that opportunity more than anything 
else seems to generate this kind of behaviour.  
(Forester and Morrison, 1994, p. 41) 
 
Opportunity Formation Through Deficient Security 
A number of texts focus on how opportunities are created through deficient security. 
With the aim of raising practitioners’ awareness, the UK Audit Commission has been 
eager to spread the message regarding the relationship between poor security and 
opportunity.  Its 1994 report, entitled Opportunity Makes a Thief (Audit Commission, 
1994) indicates that one of the primary reasons for 'computer abuse' is a disregard for 
basic controls.  More precisely, this disregard manifests itself in a failure to 
implement and maintain such controls.  These findings are mirrored in the 
Commission’s Ghost in the Machine (Audit Commission, 1998), which cites ‘little 
improvement’ with regard to the provision of internal controls.  Furthermore, this 
continued neglect is reflected in the most recent report (Audit Commission, 2001) 
which states: 
 
Auditors and security specialists continue to stress the need for proper control and 
security measures.  Nevertheless, the majority of breaches of IT security are still 
caused by a lack of the basic fundamental controls and safeguards.  
(Audit Commission, 2001, p. 17) 
 
This view is supported by other writers who note how the absence, poor 
implementation and maintenance of safeguards may engender opportunities 
(Stevenson, 2000; Comer, 1988, Bologna, 1993).   But what exactly are those factors 
which lead to such situations?  The paper will now turn to this area. 
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 Organisational Complacency Towards IS Security:  A primary reason for the absence 
of the appropriate safeguards is complacency by many organisations with regard to IS 
security (Hinde, 2001; Audit Commission, 1998).  As noted, this manifests itself in 
the failure of some organisations to implement even the most basic controls, leaving 
their systems vulnerable and possibly forming those conditions that create 
opportunities.  The last three UK Audit Commission reports clearly demonstrate this.  
A key control, for example, is establishing a security policy (Nosworthy, 2000; 
Osborne, 1998; Backhouse, 1997; Dorey, 1994).  The reports of 1994 and 1998 
indicate that one third of all surveyed organisations failed to implement this 
safeguard.  While this position had improved by 2001, one quarter of all organisations 
still failed to take any heed.   
 
One of the reasons for organisational complacency towards IS security may well be 
the failure of organisations to appreciate the value of their information assets, and the 
consequent need to protect them.  A UK Department of Trade and Industry report 
(DTI, 2000) collated data from a representative sample of 1000 UK organisations.  
Surprisingly, of these 1000, 31% believed that they did not possess any information 
that they perceived as ‘sensitive’ or ‘critical’ in nature.  Rather alarmingly, 7% of this 
figure related to organisations with over 500 or more employees. 
 
Erroneous Perceptions of IS Security Risks:  While companies may fail to appreciate 
the value of their information assets, they may also fail to recognise potential threats 
(Yapp, 2001; Riem, 2001; Wright, 2001; Hinde, 2001 Parker, 1997).  A global 
security survey by Ernst & Young (2002) reveals: 
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 Yet again we see greater concern about vulnerability to external attack (57%), 
than internal (41%), and yet leading research groups continue to confirm that 
more than three quarters of attacks originate from within organisations … an 
alarming amount of evidence remains that organisations are lacking fundamental 
management information about security breaches (Ernst & Young, 2002, pp. 8-9).   
 
This is confirmed by Parker (1997) who argues that the ‘distorted image’ of security 
held by top-level business people is often “informed” by trade publications such as 
the Wall Street Journal and Forbes.  In a similar vein, the CSI/FBI (2002) report 
indicates how the actions of defrauded organisations help to reinforce the erroneous 
perceptions of threats held by management.  Concerned with the consequences of bad 
publicity for their reputation, victims of financial fraud are often unwilling to invoke 
the aid of law enforcement agencies, preferring to deal with the matter internally.  As 
fraud cases are rarely reported in business publications, such as those discussed by 
Parker, managers subsequently fail to appreciate the gravity of the problem.  Indeed, 
Parker argues that information security practitioners must first attempt to understand 
what perceptions top managers hold and then proceed to correct any unfounded 
beliefs.  One consequence of the inability of organisations to appreciate the actual 
risks to their IS is that measures may be implemented to address risks, which in reality 
are relatively minor, at the expense of those areas where the risks are high, but receive 
little attention. 
 
Technical Perspective of IS Security:  Additionally the ‘distorted image’ of security 
held by managers is often equated with a myopic understanding of the problem area 
and how it should be addressed.  Several writers have affirmed how in many 
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organisations IS security is often perceived as a purely technical concern (von Solms 
2001; Osborne, 1998; Parker, 1997; Wood, 1995).  The problem with this perspective 
is that it fails to view the whole of the problem domain, and hence fails fully to 
appreciate all the elements that constitute such an environment.  
 
Funding of IS Security:  The organisational security budget is influenced by 
management perceptions.  Osborne (1998) argues that the technical perspective often 
leads to a poor return on investment owing to the inability of those responsible for 
security to understand and address the necessary and related managerial aspects of 
security (e.g. implementing a security policy), while concentrating too heavily on 
technical safeguards.  Hence Osborne (1998) argues that those organisations that take 
a technical approach, while spending considerable funds on safeguards such as 
cryptographic systems and firewalls, may still experience security breaches owing to 
the failure to understand and act using an holistic approach.  For an adequate level of 
organisational funding Wood (1997) argues that management need to have a clear 
understanding of the complexity of IS security.  Once this is achieved, then there is a 
greater motivation for providing the necessary funds.   
 
The Interrelated Nature of Security Controls:  One problem often overlooked when 
safeguards are introduced is their interrelated nature.  Security is very much like a 
house of cards: inadequate consideration for one area will impact on another, possibly 
creating those conditions that help to form an opportunity.  One safeguard, for 
example, is an information security policy.  Through the creation and maintenance of 
a security policy, management can provide support and direction for information 
security in an organisation.   There is no denying the importance of a security policy 
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as a cornerstone in the development of an organisation’s control environment 
(Nosworthy, 2000; Osborne, 1998; Backhouse, 1997; Dorey, 1994).  However, unless 
the policy is brought to life with education and awareness programmes, then all the 
work undertaken to create a policy will ultimately have been a waste of time 
(Nosworthy, 2000; Hansche, 2001; Hansche, 2001a; Spurling, 1995).  
 
Implementation of Inappropriate Controls:  Even prudent companies, who wish to 
establish effective security across the board, may unwittingly create the conditions 
which help to form opportunities through the implementation of inappropriate 
controls (Luzwick, 2001; Ølnes, 1994; Warman, 1993).  If the safeguards introduced 
provide an inadequate level of security then the IS will be left vulnerable.  However, 
the same is also true if the safeguards are perceived by staff as unworkable in the 
organisational context.  One of the perennial problems for IS security is its uneasy 
relationship with business objectives.  Although there is an obvious need to reduce the 
risks to IS, the related countermeasures are often seen by users as a constraint, 
because of the range of tasks required to fulfil the objectives.  If the safeguards are 
perceived to be too heavy-handed or impractical (or both), staff may circumvent the 
controls just to make their lives easier.  Again, non-compliant behaviour would leave 
the systems vulnerable, possibly providing opportunities for rogue employees.  
Hence, in this sense, although safeguards are obviously introduced to reduce risks, 
with a heavy-handed approach they may, paradoxically, create them.   
 
Safeguard Implementation: Aside from the inappropriate nature of safeguards, a 
related issue concerns the implementation of controls.  Poor implementation can 
negate any improvements in security for which a safeguard was designed.  Schneier 
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(1998) discusses cryptographic systems as a case in point.  He notes several problems 
pertaining to the poor implementation of this safeguard.  With some systems, the plain 
text which the user wishes to encrypt is not destroyed after the whole process is 
completed.  Other systems use temporary files on a computer in case of a systems 
crash.  While this is prudent, if these systems are wrongly implemented, the plain text 
is left on the hard drive.  Schneier further notes how, if poorly implemented, some 
systems can even leave the cryptographic keys on the hard drive.  
 
Compliance Reviews:  A key requisite of IS security is the need to confirm on a 
routine basis that the existing controls are working effectively.  One of the lessons 
repeated in the UK Audit Commission (1994; 1998; 2001) reports is that many 
organisations fail to check whether their controls are operating as intended.  As a 
consequence those safeguards which are failing to perform leave an IS vulnerable.  
Furthermore, given the failure of some companies to monitor their controls, these 
vulnerabilities may persist for considerable periods of time.  The reason for this 
neglect may be the perception held by some managers that IS security is a one-off 
project and they have little need to consider the on-going nature of this function 
(Wood, 1997).  The ISO/IEC17799:2000 Information Technology – Code of Practice 
for Information Security Management, however, advocates the need for compliance 
reviews at managerial and technical levels. 
 
While advocating the need to review existing safeguards, ISO/IEC17799: 2000 also 
advises organisations to address new and emerging risks to their systems.  As 
explained, the standard asserts that organisations can identify their security 
requirements by using risk assessment techniques.  By doing so companies can 
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identify their risks and implement the requisite controls.  However, just as 
organisations change in terms of business practices and resources, so too must the 
security function, for with change come new risks (Anderson, 1994).   
 
 
Deficiencies in Existing Notions of Opportunity 
Although the literature concerned with opportunity has proven useful in highlighting 
the problem areas, certain deficiencies need to be addressed. First, very little is written 
about opportunity.  This is probably due to the fact that the meaning of the term 
opportunity is regarded as self-evident and hence there is little reason to examine the 
subject. 
 
Secondly, there has been a failure to define actually what an opportunity is.  Indeed, a 
common-sense understanding of this phenomenon runs through the literature.  From 
this viewpoint an opportunity might be perceived as a file left on a desk as an example 
of non-compliance with a clear desk policy, a PC left active at lunch time which 
should have been logged off, passwords posted to machines, and the like.  The failure 
of this common-sense perspective lies in its inability to clearly explain why these so-
called opportunities are acted on in some instances and not in others.  Could it be that 
some of the instances simply do not afford an opportunity?  This points to the 
interplay of other factors, which the common-sense perspective is at a loss to explain, 
but an understanding of which would be of great value to security practitioners.  A 
more suitable theoretical explanation would be able to account for these ‘other 
factors’ and explain the variances.  Unfortunately, one of the deficiencies with regard 
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to IS security generally is the poverty of theory both used and advocated by 
academics in this field.  
 
Thirdly, the prescriptive value of the existing literature is limited.  A flawed 
understanding of opportunity offers little scope for developing effective solutions.  If 
we can assume that opportunities arise in, and as a consequence of, the daily workings 
of an organisation then any approach used to understand opportunity must be able to 
address those elements involved in these routines, and explain how interactions 
between them may create opportunities. 
 
However, this is far easier said than done.  How does one know which factors are 
influential and which are not?  How does one address the interactions between such 
factors?  How can one assume a group of these factors will create an opportunity?  In 
essence, how can one circumscribe the problem of opportunity in order to address it? 
 
 
Criminological Theories and Opportunity 
Clarke (1997) argues that one mistake of modern criminology is how the task of 
explaining crime has been assumed to be the same as explaining the criminal.  
‘Dispositional’ criminological theories have been eager to provide accounts of why 
and how individuals through the assimilation of specific social or psychological 
influences, or the inheritance of traits, are as a consequence more inclined to acts of a 
delinquent or criminal nature.  This is not the same as explaining the occurrence of 
crime, which aside from requiring a motivated offender, also warrants an opportunity.  
Simply to explain criminal dispositions, Clarke contends, is only half the equation.  
 13
What is further required are explanations of how offenders interact with the settings in 
which crime may or may not occur (Ekblom, 1994).  It is for this reason that the 
following five criminological approaches are introduced in this paper for their insights 
into opportunity. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention 
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) focuses on the criminal setting and aims to reduce 
the opportunities for crime through the implementation of measures in the 
environment.  Furthermore, these measures a) target specific forms of crime, b) 
impact on the immediate environment via its design, management, or manipulation, 
and c) aim either to increase the effort and risks of crime, or to render these less 
rewarding or excusable.  Examples of these measures, which are categorised into 
certain types, include the controlling of facilitators (e.g., gun controls: to increase the 
effort), entry/exit screening (baggage screening: to increase the risks), target removal 
(e.g., removable car radios: to reduce the rewards), and rule-setting (e.g., harassment 
codes: to remove excuses), (Clarke, 1997).   
 
As noted, SCP’s focus is crime-specific.  This stems from a recognition that specific 
types of crime are unique in their mix of constituent environmental factors.  In 
forgoing a discussion of crime prevention at the level of ‘burglary’ or ‘robbery’, 
greater emphasis is placed on those specific crimes that fall under these broader 
categories. 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of safeguards into the immediate environment is 
designed to impact on the offender’s perception about the potential costs and benefits 
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of crime commission.  Adjustments made in terms of the manipulation, design, or 
management of the environment are intended either to increase the perceived risks or 
reduce the rewards of the potential crime or both.  The decision to commit a crime 
will be based on the perceptions and evaluations of the situation.  It is no surprise, 
then, to learn that SCP has drawn heavily on rational choice theory, discussed further 
in the next section. 
 
Finally, it is assumed as part of the decision-making process that some evaluation is 
made with respect to the possible moral costs of offending.  While some offender may 
be prepared to shoplift, this does not mean they are prepared to mug the elderly.  In an 
attempt however to overcome any feelings of guilt or shame, offenders may try to 
neutralise such feelings through the construction of excuses such as ‘everybody else 
does it’, ‘I’m just borrowing it’, etc.  Support for this assertion comes from earlier 
criminological writings by Sykes and Matza (1957) who discuss ‘techniques of 
neutralisation’ and Bandura (1976) who, in a similar vein, addresses the concept of 
‘self-exoneration’. 
 
Rational Choice Perspective 
The watershed in the development of SCP was a simple ‘choice’ model of crime 
(Clarke, 1980), which later evolved into the formulation of a ‘rational choice 
perspective’, which has been extremely influential in determining the theoretical base 
of SCP (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Clarke and Cornish, 
2000).  The rational choice perspective assumes that crimes are deliberate and 
purposive: that is, those who commit crimes do so with the intention of deriving some 
type of benefit from such acts.  Obvious examples are cash or material goods, but a 
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broader reading of the term ‘benefits’ allows for the inclusion of other forms, such as 
prestige, fun, excitement, sexual gratification, and domination.  Joyriding is an 
example of how the benefits may take the intangible forms of fun and excitement.   
 
In addition, the rational choice approach assumes that decisions are characterised by 
what is termed ‘bounded’ or ‘limited’ rationality.  In other words, criminal decision 
making is at times less than perfect, as a consequence of the conditions under which 
such decisions are made.  With the associated risks and uncertainty in offending, 
criminals may make decisions without knowledge of all the potential costs and 
benefits (i.e. the risks, efforts and rewards). 
 
Central to the rational choice perspective (and SCP) is the concept of crime 
specificity.  The factors considered by criminals and the related variables that 
influence the decision making process vary considerably with the nature of the 
offence.  Thus the analysis of decision-making needs to be made with reference to 
specific categories of crime. 
 
Of further importance to the rational choice perspective is the division of criminal 
choices into two groups viz., ‘involvement’ and ‘event’ decisions.  The former refers 
to choices an offender makes regarding their criminal careers.  Hence, the offender 
must make decisions about embarking on criminal actions, whether or not to continue 
these activities over a period of time, and when, if at all, to cease them.  Or to use the 
technical terminology, choices must be made about the initiation, habituation and 
desistance of a criminal career.   
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Event decisions refer to those choices made during the criminal act.  These decisions 
are based on the offender’s perceptions of the situation and the associated risks, 
efforts and rewards.  Originally, work in this area focused solely on choices made in 
terms of the potential targets (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986), 
but as a result of theoretical advancements, it was realised that as the criminal act 
unfolds, the perpetrator  is required to make a series of decisions (Clarke and Cornish, 
2000). 
 
Environmental Criminology 
One school of thought closely related to the rational choice perspective is 
environmental criminology.  This approach has provided considerable insight into the 
‘search’ patterns of offenders and illustrated how the majority of crimes are 
committed within areas visited by offenders during their routine work and leisure 
pursuits (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991).  Offenders develop an ‘action space’ 
in which these everyday pursuits take place and through such activities acquire a 
detailed knowledge of this environment, leading to what these authors describe as an 
‘awareness space’.  Like the rational choice perspective, Brantingham and 
Brantingham (1991) argue that the motivated individual engages in a ‘multi-staged 
decision process’ prior to the commission - or not as the case may be - of a crime.  
Such a process is informed through knowledge gathered from the offender’s 
awareness space.  Furthermore, they argue that a specific environment emits cues 
relating to its spatial, cultural, legal and psychological characteristics.  With 
experience, an offender is able to discern certain sequences and configurations of 
these cues associated with a ‘good’ target.  
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Routine Activity 
SCP has further been developed by Routine Activity Theory, another relative 
newcomer to the field of criminology.  Cohen and Felson (1979) discuss how changes 
in what they describe as ‘routine activities’ of society’s members have impacted on 
the levels of direct-contact predatory crimes, i.e. crimes where one or more persons 
directly take or damage the person or property of another.  These activities include the 
provision of food, shelter, leisure, work, child-rearing, and sexual outlets.  It is argued 
that these forms of behaviour influence direct-contact predatory crime rates by 
impacting on the convergence in time and space, of the three elements required for a 
crime to occur.  These elements consist of a likely offender, a suitable target, and the 
absence of a capable guardian, who, if present, would be in a position to stop a 
criminal act.  Cohen and Felson assert that it takes merely the absence of one of these 
three elements for a crime not to occur.  So for example, drawing on U.S.A. census 
data and victimisation surveys, they reveal how between 1960-1970, daytime 
residential burglary increased by 15%.  They partly explain this rise by noting how 
the decade also witnessed an increase in the number of females in the workforce and a 
rise in the number of individuals living alone.  As a consequence, there was a related 
rise in the number of properties left vacant and lacking a capable guardian during the 
working day. 
 
Routine activity theory is still in a period of transition, as witnessed by the attempts of 
Felson (1992) to extend the scope of routine activity (by suggesting minimal elements 
for other categories of crime), and include a fourth element - that of the ‘intimate 
handler’ - in relation to direct-contact predatory offences.  Drawing on social control 
theory (Hirschi, 1969), ‘intimate handlers’ refers to those individuals who, by 
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knowing an offender, may act as a brake on illegal activities carried out by the latter.  
As a means of enhancing its contribution to crime prevention, Clarke (1992) 
advocates that routine activity theory could incorporate the category of ‘crime 
facilitators’.  These relate to items such as cars, guns, and credit cards, which act as 
tools for specific crimes - as well as dis-inhibitors such as alcohol, which facilitate the 
precipitation of crimes. 
 
 
Lifestyle Theory 
Lifestyle theory represents a school of thought closely related to the routine activity 
approach.  A central theme of lifestyle theory asserts how the differential risks of 
victimisation are related to the differential exposure to offenders.  While socio-
demographic factors exert some influence on this relationship, an individual’s 
lifestyle activities must also be acknowledged when considering the risk of 
victimisation, given that such activities may increase contact with potential offenders.  
This is confirmed by Hindelang et al (1978) who advance a theoretical model of 
victimisation based on data from eight American cities.  In addition, they list a series 
of propositions with respect to how particular lifestyles carry greater probabilities of 
victimisation.  These include, for example: 
 
The probability of suffering a personal victimisation is directly related to the 
amount of time that a person spends in public places (e.g. on the street, in parks, 
etc.), and particularly in public places at night (p. 251). 
The probability of being in public places, particularly at night, varies as a function 
of lifestyle (p. 253). 
(Hindelang et al, 1978) 
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The findings produced by victimological studies indicate how the risks of 
victimisation can be reduced through the modification of patterns of behaviour. 
  
 
The Opportunity Structure for Crime 
In an article by Cusson (1986), he argues that a synthesis of these theories is 
inevitable.  Clarke (1995) attempts such a synthesis as shown in Fig. 1 entitled the 
‘Opportunity Structure for Crime’.  While the model is able to incorporate 
dispositional variables of traditional criminology, it should again be stressed that 
through the synthesis of the five criminological approaches, the focus of the model is 
very much on the interaction between the offender and their environment.   
 
As per Fig.1, the physical environment encompasses the layout of cities, forms of 
housing, retail and transport systems, technology and communications and the various 
types of vehicles used by individuals.  Hence the physical environment affords both 
targets and facilitators.  Convenience stores and banks are example of the former, 
while get-away cars and guns illustrate the latter.  Furthermore, as noted earlier, 
lifestyle and routine activities also influence the number of targets.  The behaviours 
inscribed in lifestyle and routine activities i.e. work, leisure, residence and shopping, 
can either enhance or hinder guardianship.  For example, a house left vacant owing to 
the single occupant working during the day manifests a lack of guardianship, and 
represents a more viable target for a burglar.  The behavioural patterns represented in 
lifestyle and routine activities also play a significant role in supplying victims of 
personal and sexual attacks e.g. an individual walking home alone at night after 
visiting a night-club with friends, or working a shift in a restaurant.   
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Fig. 1 
Opportunity Structure For Crime 
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At a macro level, the socio-economic structure determines the lifestyle/routine 
activities and the physical environment.  The former includes demography, 
geography, industrialisation, urbanisation, welfare/health, education, and legal 
institutions.  The socio-economic structure also partly determines the number of 
potential offenders through sub-cultural influences, such as neglect and lack of love, 
alienation etc. (identified by traditional criminology), and partly through lifestyle and 
routine activities.  These can influence the degree of social control afforded by 
intimate handlers, leading to a possible lack of supervision and freedom of movement.   
What needs to be stressed here is that the opportunity structure is not simply a 
physical entity, consisting of the routine activities of the population and the nature of 
the physical environment.  Rather, it comprises interaction between supplies of 
victims, targets, potential offenders, and facilitators, which determine the nature and 
the scale of opportunities.  These interactions largely take place in the ‘action’ and 
subsequently in the ‘awareness’ spaces of offenders as indicated by the 
search/perception – information modelling sections of the model and highlighted by 
environmental criminology.  The offender’s perceptions, - highlighted by the rational 
choice perspective, but also environmental criminology - of the risks, efforts, and 
rewards associated with such spaces play a crucial role in defining the opportunity 
structure. 
 
 
Crime Specific Opportunity Structures? 
As discussed earlier, the measures employed by SCP are crime specific.  Hence, 
measures are not aimed at broad categories of crime such as burglary or robbery, but 
tailored specifically to those offences which fall under these umbrella terms.  Poyner  
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and Webb (1991), for example, from their research into burglary in a British city, 
argue that different controls are required to combat domestic burglary, which targets 
cash and jewellery, from that which targets electronic goods.  While Fig. 1 represents 
at a generic level those items thought to constitute an opportunity, is it feasible to 
advance the idea of crime specific opportunity structures?  In other words, is it 
feasible to address opportunities in this manner?  Fig. 2 represents a hypothetical 
 
crime specific opportunity structure with regard to computer input fraud (Willison, 
2002).  Clarke’s (1995) model has been modified given the nature of the crime and 
the context in which the crime is traditionally enacted i.e. the organisational 
environment.        
 
As can be seen from Fig. 2, the ‘Lifestyle’ patterns of behaviour, and the ‘victims’ 
box has been omitted.  The intention here is not to suggest that organisations are not 
victims of computer input fraud.  Instead, the theory underpinning this part of the 
model – lifestyle theory – explains how an individual’s behaviour can increase their 
risk of victimisation.  As a consequence, it was felt that this element of Clarke’s 
(1995) model had little relevance to the organisational context. 
 
In keeping with Fig.1, targets and their nature are the result of the physical 
environment, which in this instance consists of departmental offices.  The commission 
of input fraud involves entering false information into computer systems.  Given this, 
the target could therefore be computerised accounting records, bank account details 
etc.  Targets are also partly determined by routine activities, which in the 
organisational domain encompass work practices.  Such practices can be seen to 
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either enhance or hinder control over a target, and are depicted in Fig. 2 as 
guardianship factors.  The intention here is to illustrate the plethora of safeguards 
required in the organisational domain to provide effective guardianship.  Staff non-
compliance with security procedures, for example, would provide a lack of 
guardianship and leave the associated IS vulnerable. 
 
As a departure from Fig. 1, facilitators are provided not only by the physical 
environment, but also by the routine activities of staff.  In terms of the environment, 
the organisational context provides facilitators in the form of computers, which the 
offender uses to help carry out the input fraud.  With regard to routine activities of 
staff, the organisational environment provides a forum in which cognitive facilitators 
can be developed and used by potential offenders (Willison, 2002, 2004).  This type 
of facilitator includes those skills and knowledge that a person acquires to discharge 
their job responsibilities.  Although such skills are used by staff, on the whole, for 
purely legitimate activities, they can also be used to help perpetrate behaviour of an 
illegal nature. 
 
Again, at a macro level, the socio-economic structure determines the routine activities 
and physical environment in the form of commercial organisation.  The socio-
economic structure, as per Fig. 1, partly determines the number of potential offenders, 
through sub-cultural influences including alienation, lack of love, etc., or in other 
words the traditional domain of dispositional theories.  While Fig. 2 maintains this 
element of the model, the focus on specific socio-economic factors shifts.  Classic 
fraud profiles point to a different set of socio-economic factors, which may motivate 
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an offender (Bologna, 1993; Comer, 1998).  These include addictions in their various 
guises, marital breakdown, financial problems and the like.   
 
The number of potential offenders as with Fig. 1 is also partly determined by routine 
activities in terms of the degree of supervision afforded by managers, leading to either 
handled or unhandled staff, and hence potential offenders.  In keeping with the 
original model, Fig. 2 acknowledges the search-perception and information modelling 
activities of potential offenders in their action and awareness spaces.  In this instance, 
departmental offices represent the awareness space for rogue staff.  Through the 
discharging of their work responsibilities, potential offenders are able to assess the 
integrity of their respective control environments, ‘searching’ for potential 
vulnerabilities, and using this information possibly as a basis for criminal activity.  
Through the incorporation of the criminological theories, the crime specific 
opportunity structure affords consideration of the forms of behaviour an offender 
exhibits when planning and perpetrating a crime.  A better understanding of this 
behaviour can be used to inform employees responsible for managing systems risk 
through the implementation of countermeasures. 
 
An application of the model can perhaps illustrate its potential.  The 2001 UK Audit 
Report (Audit Commission, 2001), entitled Yourbusiness@risk, cites the example of a 
local government employee who committed computer input fraud.  Prior to the actual 
perpetration of the fraud, the dishonest staff member developed trusting relationships 
with his fellow employees.  This trust was reflected in the fact that his workmates 
neglected to lock-down their computers when leaving the office.  This vulnerability 
provided the necessary opening for the offender, as different computers provided 
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different access to parts of an invoicing system.  As a consequence, when his 
colleagues left the office, the dishonest staff member would access their computers to 
process the fraud.  In total, £15,000 was embezzled through the setting-up, inputting 
and authorisation of fictitious invoices. 
 
When applying the model to the above example, consideration can first be given to 
the routine activities of the offender.  The case highlights a lack of managerial 
supervision leaving the offender unhandled.  Indeed, the Audit Report (Audit 
Commission, 2001) notes how the local authority subsequently increased oversight of 
employees working with the invoicing system.  Although not mentioned in the case, it 
could be that the embezzlement was motivated by an addiction, marital breakdown, 
financial problems and so forth.  Did the local authority have any monitoring or 
counselling in place to help identify and address these potential problems? 
 
As noted in the model, unhandled offenders and factors such as addictions and marital 
break-downs provide the numbers for and motivations of potential offenders.  At the 
search/perception and information/ modelling stage of the crime specific opportunity 
structure, offenders assess their environment (awareness space), gleaning information 
about any security vulnerabilities that may possibly be exploited.  It is clear that this 
offender had a sound knowledge of existing security vulnerabilities.  With regard to 
the concept of bounded rationality, given that he worked in the organisation where the 
crime took place, the offender had access to a relatively high quality of information.  
During the course of his routine activities the offender was, therefore, able to garner 
the requisite information.  More specifically, the dishonest employee was able to 
gather precise knowledge about the guardianship factors designed to safeguard the 
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target, in this instance the invoicing system.  Hence, the offender was able to identify 
the vulnerability created when colleagues, on leaving the office, failed to lock-down 
their computers (creating a lack of guardianship).  Indeed, the offender was 
instrumental in creating the vulnerability by fostering trusting relationships with 
workmates.  This ability to manipulate the environment in which the crime takes place 
is an option open to relatively few offenders, and generally only to those who are 
employed in such contexts.   
 
To set up, input and authorise the fictitious invoices, the rogue employee required 
access to a number of computers.  Thus, at a technical level, there was a segregation 
of access rights.  While this safeguard was overcome by the offender, in order to 
perpetrate the fraud he also required working knowledge of the whole invoicing 
system.  There is no mention in the Audit Report, of how this cognitive facilitator was 
acquired by the offender.  It is possible that he was previously employed by the local 
authority to work on other parts of the invoicing system, thus enhancing his 
knowledge of the processes.  Alternatively, the offender might have abused the trust 
developed with colleagues, by ‘innocently’ enquiring about the workings of the 
system.  In either case, the offender was able to develop the cognitive facilitator to a 
level which afforded perpetration of the fraud.  
 
The above example can be seen to support the concepts inscribed in the crime specific 
opportunity structure.  In addition, the criminological theories can further be drawn on 
to provide tools, techniques and analytical methods for practitioners intent on 
reducing systems risk.  For example, organisations could adopt the opportunity-
reducing techniques advocated by SCP.  Their implementation would be aided by the 
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fact that the techniques are underpinned by a theoretical conceptualisation of the 
offender, advanced by the rational choice perspective.  As a consequence, the range of 
techniques offers a thorough and systematic classification for practitioners. 
 
Another example, which can be seen to support the application of the model and 
efforts to reduce systems risk, concerns the development of crime scripts (Cornish, 
1994; Willison, 2005).  This preventive method can assist in the implementation of 
suitable safeguards, through the analysis of the criminal behaviour, which leads to the 
commission of a crime.  Although originally developed to assist in the 
implementation of SCP controls, there is no reason why the method could not be 
utilised by IS security practitioners (Willison, 2005).  Indeed, it should be noted that, 
in keeping with the crime specific opportunity structure, scripts also have a crime-
specific focus. 
 
 The origins of this method can be found in the field of cognitive science, which has 
addressed the production and understanding of sequences of events and actions.  As 
its name suggests, the concept derives from recognition of how knowledge about 
processes and routines take a specific form, similar to a theatrical script (Schank and 
Abelson, 1977).  When applied to criminal behaviour, the aim of developing scripts is 
to help practitioners correctly to identify the stages (or ‘scenes’) in the commission of 
a crime.  Through a clearer understanding of these stages, greater insight is afforded 
into the placement of suitable controls. 
 
Table 1 provides an example of a crime script developed with regard to the local 
authority fraud (Willison, 2005).  The first column represents the stage in the script.  
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With each stage comes a corresponding behaviour.  Once this behaviour is correctly 
identified, suitable controls can be applied.  Used in conjunction with the crime 
specific opportunity structure, a related script can enhance understanding of the 
interaction between the potential offenders, targets and facilitators.  
 
Table 1 Computer Input-Fraud Script 
SCENCE FUNCTION SCRIPT ACTION SITUATIONAL 
CONTROL 
Preparation Deliberately gaining 
access to the organisation 
Prospective employee 
screening 
Entry Already authorised as 
employee 
------ 
Pre-condition Wait for employees 
absence from offices. 
Physical segregation of 
duties. 
Staggered breaks 
Signing In/Out of offices 
Instrumental  
Pre-Condition 
Access colleagues’ 
computers 
System time outs 
Biometric fingerprint 
authentication 
Instrumental 
Initiation 
Access programmes 
 
Password use for access to 
specific programmes 
Instrumental 
Actualization 
False customer account 
construction 
Two person sign-off on 
creation of new accounts 
Doing Authorisation of fictitious 
invoices 
Audit of computer logs 
Budget monitoring 
 
Post Condition Exit programmes ------ 
Exit Exit system User event viewer 
Doing Later Spend the transferred 
money 
------ 
(Willison, 2005) 
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Discussion  
The model elaborated in this paper may act as a useful conceptual schema, with its 
consideration of offender behaviour in the organisational context.  Insights gleaned 
through the application of the model can then be used to inform practitioners’ 
knowledge of local systems risk.  This is turn can likewise be used to inform the 
implementation of countermeasures.  Undoubtedly all of the safeguards indicated in 
the example of the local government fraud are already being implemented by good 
security management in many organisations.  What the crime specific opportunity 
structure offers is a holistic conceptualisation of the problem under scrutiny, and the 
means through which to analyse the said problem.  In this way, management may 
draw on the model for guidance when considering systems risk.   
 
Furthermore, as the crime specific opportunity structure affords additional guidance 
on safeguard implementation, uncertainty is reduced with regard to the input from 
those departments collectively responsible for IS security.  This guidance is enhanced 
by the model through its identification of the different aspects of the offender (e.g. 
motivation, search patterns).  Indeed, the role of the respective departments can be 
elicited more accurately if the model is used in conjunction with the scripts concept.  
This would help to ensure the appropriate implementation of safeguards and the 
departments responsible for them. 
 
As security breaks out of its technical citadel to become a ubiquitous reality for all 
users of information, there is a pressing need for a theoretical framework against 
which practitioners may diagnose problems, plan action and implement solutions.  
The question then becomes one of which theory?  If we are attempting to address 
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computer criminals and their criminal behaviour, criminology would appear a suitable 
body of theory from which to draw on (Harrington, 1996; Straub and Welke, 1998; 
Willison, 2004, 2005).  Each theory inscribed in the model may potentially offer the 
practitioner new insights into the behaviour of dishonest staff.  The rational choice 
perspective, for example, affords practitioners a theoretical insight into the decision-
making processes undertaken by potential offenders.  As noted with the literature on 
opportunity, common sense perceptions, which more often than not guide security 
practices, often fail on closer scrutiny, and hence the importation of criminological 
theory may prove timely.    
 
 
Conclusions and Further Research 
The likelihood that an IS is inadequately protected against certain types of damage or 
loss constitutes systems risk (Straub and Welke, 1998).  When addressing the latter, 
consideration should be given to the threat posed by dishonest employees, intent on 
committing some form of computer abuse (Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Kesar and 
Rogerson, 1998).  A number of researchers have examined the extent to which those 
responsible for managing security are cognizant of the very nature of systems risk.  
Goodhue and Straub (1991) advance a model of managerial perceptions of this form 
of risk.  They note how informed perceptions are based on knowledge of 
‘organisational environment’, ‘IS environment’ and ‘individual characteristics’.  In 
terms of individual characteristics, this refers to knowledge of local systems risk and 
the associated threats. 
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Unfortunately, existing research notes how practitioners’ knowledge of individual 
characteristics is often ‘fragmented’ and ‘incomplete’, contributing to situations 
where efforts to reduce systems risk are often less than effective (Straub and Welke, 
1998; Loch et al, 1992; Straub, 1986a; Straub, 1986b).  To complicate matters, any 
effective attempt to enforce IS security requires input from a number of departments, 
including, for example, HR, IS/IT, and physical security (Schlarman, 2002; 
Fitzgerald, 2005; ISO/IEC 17799:2000, 2000). 
 
In an attempt to compliment existing research, but also representing a departure, this 
paper addresses systems risk from the offender’s perspective.  More specifically a 
model known as the ‘Crime Specific Opportunity Structure’ is advanced (Willison, 
2002).  Drawing on a number of criminological theories, the model potentially aids 
conceptualisation of the relationship between the offender, the organisational context, 
the requisite safeguards and the departments responsible for them. 
 
SCP systematically classifies a range of safeguards which could feasibly be adopted 
for the IS security domain.  The rational choice perspective provides insights into the 
decision making processes of the offender.  Complemented by the ‘scripts’ concept, 
there is the potential for a clearer understanding of the stages (scenes) of a specific 
crime.  In a similar vein, environmental criminology acknowledges the multiple 
stages, and the related decisions, of a criminal act.  In addition, this body of theory 
addresses the search patterns of offenders with regard to potential targets.  Each 
specific environment emits cues relating to spatial, cultural, legal and psychological 
characteristics.  As a consequence, an experienced offender is able to discern ‘good’ 
targets, which are characterised by certain sequences and configurations of these cues.   
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Appreciating and understanding these sequences and configurations may have 
implications for IS security control environments.  Finally, routine activity theory 
looks at the elements required for a crime to occur.  Central to this approach is an 
appreciation of how individuals act as guardians over potential targets.  As seen, it 
was the failure by the local authority to provide guardianship over their computers, 
which enabled the perpetration of the fraud by their dishonest employee.  
Understanding the chemistry of crimes and the role of facilitators (both in terms of 
how they are developed and prevented), may provide additional food for thought for 
practitioners. 
 
When these approaches are combined in the form of the crime specific opportunity 
structure, there is the potential for a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
an offender and the environment in which they commit crime.  More informed 
insights into this relationship can feasibly inform managers as to the nature of 
opportunities in the organisational context, when addressing systems risk.  Based on 
such insights, managers can use this knowledge to underpin the application of 
countermeasures.  In addition, the criminological theories can further be drawn on to 
provide tools, techniques and analytical methods for enhancing the application of 
countermeasures. 
 
Theoretical coherence of the crime specific opportunity structure 
In an attempt to assess the theoretical soundness of the model, further research could 
involve the application of the model to numerous forms of computer abuse.  By doing 
so, theoretical shortcomings of the crime specific opportunity structure would be 
evident.  From another perspective, the application of the model can be seen as a 
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chance to develop the criminological concepts inscribed in the theories (Willison, 
2002, 2004). The use of such theory in new contexts enables the possibility of 
expanding and enhancing existing themes and concepts.  Facilitators are a case in 
point.  Traditional examples of this concept (e.g. get-away cars, guns for robberies) 
have a physical nature.  Examining computer abuse in the organisational setting 
affords consideration of those facilitators used by rogue employees.  While 
‘cognitive’ facilitators are a marked departure from their physical cousins, their role is 
the same.  As with traditional facilitators, preventive strategies can consider control 
techniques e.g. segregation of duties.  
 
The value of the model for practitioners: 
Further research is required to investigate whether the crime specific opportunity 
structure is able to provide practitioners with a better view of the problem domain, 
including the interaction between the potential offenders and their environments.  
Does the model identify organically problems that would otherwise be randomly 
addressed or indeed ignored altogether?  How far can the model be used as a basis for 
educating managers about local systems risk?  Can the model be used to support 
safeguard allocation? 
 
The perspective offered by the crime specific opportunity structure provides a 
potential alternative to some of the technocratic approaches to IS security.  While 
further research is required to assess the feasibility of the model, introducing 
criminology into the field offers news perspectives and opens up the way for much-
needed theoretical imports. 
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